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Preemption, I Think Not:  
Evaluating California’s Stored  
Energy Procurement Law Against  




California’s Energy Storage Systems procurement mandate is 
a groundbreaking measure designed to supply more clean and reli-
able energy to the state by allowing the capture of power produced 
now to be used later. While this technology is still developing, a 
ready market for such resources will help advance capabilities and 
bring down cost. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) 
Order 841 will springboard storage technology in regions covered 
by Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) by allowing 
storage providers non-discriminatory and accommodating access to 
the FERC wholesale markets. Although FERC’s new Order speaks 
directly to the issue of storage technology, it should not be seen as 
an effort to usurp or preempt state authority to encourage the use of 
storage technology for electricity generation in the states. By focus-
ing on the targets of state storage laws and honoring the authority 
left to states under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), a system of con-
current federalism will allow state and federal law to operate hand-
in-hand to promote the advancement of storage technology, facili-
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I. BACKGROUND TO THE UNITED STATES’ 
ELECTRICITY MARKET 
 The United States electricity market is ever-changing. What 
was once a market controlled by vertically integrated monopolies, 
now has vast pockets of market-based prices and robust competi-
tion between providers. “Molding the electricity business into the 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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form du jour of American monopolists was one of the most remark-
able projects, intellectually as well as fiscally, of the twentieth cen-
tury.”1 Breaking the monopolies and introducing competitive mar-
kets has arguably been one of the great successes of the twenty-
first. As the energy landscape continues to move, jurisdictional ten-
sion will be its ever-present companion. Moving into 2019, there is 
a shift toward clean renewable sources of power production.2 While 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) retains ju-
risdiction over all transmission and wholesale sales of electric en-
ergy in interstate commerce,3 such regulation does not extend to 
matters “subject to regulation by the States.”4 Thus, states have 
tremendous power to influence the type of generation they encour-
age, the required fuel mix used by utilities, and the siting of new 
sources of generation. 
Energy law in the United States was once thought to be gov-
erned by a system of “dual federalism.”5 Under this system, federal 
and state authorities governed their own distinct “spheres of au-
thority” which rarely, if ever, overlapped.6 2015 marked the begin-
ning of the modern age of energy regulation when the United 
States Supreme Court weighed in on Oneok v. Learjet, the first of 
three energy law cases heard by the Court establishing the modern 
analytical framework for jurisdictional issues.7 After Oneok, the 
Court heard two more cases, FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n 
(“EPSA”) and Hughes v. Talen Energy, both of which contributed 
to the new framework governing judicial analysis of jurisdictional 
 
1. GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN AMERICAS AND 
OUR ENERGY FUTURE, 62–63 (Bloomsbury USA) (2016) (discussing Samuel Insull’s 
remarkable work crafting the electricity market into a natural monopoly to match 
other monopolistic commodities of the day such as steel and oil). 
2. See generally U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2019 
WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2050, 9-28 (2019), https://perma.cc/6LLL-M843.  
3. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2018). 
4. Id. § 824(a).  
5. See Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead, and 
What Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2017). 
6. Id. 
7. Oneok Inc., v. Learjet Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).  
3
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challenges in energy law.8 While this new structure may have es-
tablished a system of concurrent jurisdiction9 where state and fed-
eral government operate cooperatively, FERC still speaks with the 
voice of the federal government, and the Supremacy Clause10 of the 
U.S. Constitution is the ultimate law of the land. 
Testing the now blurred jurisdictional lines are Electric Stor-
age Resources (“ESRs”). FERC defines an ESR as “a resource ca-
pable of receiving electric energy from the grid and storing it for 
later injection of electricity back to the grid[.]”11 ESRs include tech-
nologies such as “pumped hydroelectric, compressed air, batteries, 
flywheels, and thermal storage,” amongst others technologies.12 As 
ESRs gained popularity, it became evident that existing market 
participation rules in the RTO service areas were not recognizing 
the unique physical and operational characteristics that ESRs pos-
sessed, preventing them from providing all of the services that they 
were technically able to purvey.13 
On November 17, 2016, FERC issued a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (“NOPR”) addressing barriers to the participation of 
 
8. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) [hereinafter 
EPSA]; Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). These deci-
sions “herald a new approach to governing the rapid evolution of the modern elec-
tric grid . . . ” Eisen, supra note 5, at 3. 
9. See generally Eisen, supra note 5, at 10–17 (advocating that recent Su-
preme Court holdings should give way to a cooperative system of electricity regu-
lation called “concurrent jurisdiction”). 
10. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land. . . .”).  
11. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(9) (2018). 
12. JEFFERY S. DENNIS, ET AL., BERKLEY NATIONAL LABORATORY, 
FEDERAL/STATE JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGING ELECTRIC 
TECHNOLOGIES, A-3 (2016), https://perma.cc/5CUD-GPG8; Order No. 841, Electric 
Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organiza-
tions and Independent System Operators, 83 Fed. Reg. 9,580, 9,585 (Mar. 6, 2018) 
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order No. 841]. 
13. See Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator 
Inc., 158 FERC ¶ 61,107 (Feb. 1, 2017); 18 C.F.R. § 35.34 (2018) (establishing 
RTOs); see also JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A 
NUTSHELL 405–11 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2017) (describing the struc-
ture and functions of RTOs).  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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ESRs and Distributed Energy Resource aggregations in FERC or-
ganized wholesale power markets.14 The Storage NOPR was 
FERC’s response to concerns about RTOs and utilities having in-
consistent rules that created barriers to market entry.15 There 
were also concerns surrounding ESR developers’ inability to re-
ceive the full amount of compensation they were capable of earning 
because their resources were not allowed to provide all of the ser-
vices they technically could have.16 At the time the Storage NOPR 
was issued, the Commission lacked the votes to issue a final rule 
on the topic.17 However, in early 2018, FERC had the pull it needed 
to take binding action.18 
On February 15, 2018, the highly anticipated final rule was 
released.19 Acting pursuant to statutory duty in section 205 of the 
Federal Power Act (“FPA”),20 FERC declared existing RTO market 
rules governing the inclusion of ESRs in the wholesale markets to 
be “unjust and unreasonable in light of barriers that they present 
to the participation of electric storage in the RTO/ISO [Independ-
ent System Operator] markets,21 [because they] reduc[e] competi-
tion and fail[] to ensure just and reasonable rates.”22 Using its au-
thority under section 206 of the FPA,23 FERC created a rule with 
the force of law requiring RTOs (and ISOs) to revise tariffs estab-
lishing market rules recognizing the unique physical and opera-
tional characteristics of ESRs to facilitate the participation of such 
resources in the wholesale markets.24 Order 841 lays out four main 
 
14. Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Trans-
mission Organizations and Independent System Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 86,522 
(proposed Nov. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 35 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Storage 
NOPR]. 
15. Id. at 86,524–25. 
16. A. Cory Lankford & Adam Wenner, FERC Steps Up Efforts to Support 
Integration of Stored Energy Technologies into Wholesale Power Markets, 17 
PRATT’S ENERGY L. REPORT 7.01, 6–7 (2017). 
17. Id. at 4. 
18. See generally Order No. 841, supra note 12. 
19. Id. 
20. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). 
21. Independent systems operators (ISOs) are one of two a sub-categories of 
RTOs—ISO are structured as non-profit entities, while for-profit RTOs are called 
“transcos.”  See TOMAIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 408-09. 
22. Order No. 841, supra note 12, at 9,585. 
23. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). 
24. Order No. 841, supra note 12, at 9,580. 
5
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criteria that RTO tariffs must meet in order to carry out the goals 
of the rule: 
 
(1) ensure that a resource using the participation model for 
electric storage resources is eligible to provide all capacity, 
energy, and ancillary services that it is technically capable of 
providing in the RTO/ISO markets; (2) ensure that a resource 
using the participation model for electric storage resources 
can be dispatched and can set the wholesale market clearing 
price as both a wholesale seller and wholesale buyer con-
sistent with existing market rules that govern when a re-
source can set the wholesale price; (3) account for the physi-
cal and operational characteristics of electric storage 
resources through bidding parameters or other means; and 
(4) establish a minimum size requirement for participation 
in the RTO/ISO markets that does not exceed 100 kW.25 
 
Pursuant to statutory authority, FERC justified Order 841 as an 
action to ensure RTO/ISO tariffs are just and reasonable.26 
 After Order 841, questions emerge as to the effect on state-led 
ESR initiatives. While it is true that the Order instructs FERC 
governed RTO/ISOs to establish minimum standards for ESR par-
ticipation in FERC wholesale markets,27 state storage initiatives 
could be swallowed by FERC’s jurisdictional power grab and be 
vulnerable to challenges of preemption by the new federal law. As 
such, the main legal question presented is whether Order 841 
places ESRs squarely within FERC’s sphere of influence, or 
whether the Order imposes a cooperative form of concurrent juris-
diction. This Article focuses on California’s Assembly Bill 2514 
(“AB 2514”) codified in Chapter 7.7 of the California Public Utili-
ties Code, and concludes that, because California law governs a 
practice that directly affects retail rates by using a carve-out for 





25. Id. at 9,582. 
26. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a); Order No. 841,supra note 12, at 9,580. 
27. Order No. 841, supra note 12, at 9,582–83. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
  
2019] Preemption, I Think Not 235 
 
II. ELECTRICITY STORAGE AND STATE 
INITIATIVES 
Electricity markets are generally viewed as more volatile than 
other energy markets, mainly because the commodity cannot be 
economically stored. Thus, real-time demand creates an almost un-
mitigated effect on prices.28 The electrical grid must maintain a 
perpetual state of balance: “consumption must always match pro-
duction, for there is as of yet no real means of storing that electric-
ity for later use. If power is not being made right now, somewhere, 
somehow, we simply don’t have it to use.”29 Compare this to the 
natural gas market where it is not only possible, but common prac-
tice, to store excess gas production for usage during times of peak 
demand.30 
The gas industry experiences demand variation on a seasonal 
basis; the northern states consume larger volumes of gas in the 
cold months, and electricity producers use gas at a disproportional 
rate in the summer when residential customers crank up the air 
conditioning.31 To combat this increased demand and mitigate its 
overall market effects, the gas industry utilizes storage reser-
voirs—usually spent gas reserves, which have been converted into 
holding tanks for excess gas. This excess gas is readily available 
for pipeline distribution to the marketplace.32 Electricity produc-
ers, however, have a rapidly changing demand to meet, fluctuating 
hour-by-hour rather than season-by-season, while doing so without 
stored reserves.33 This ever-fluctuating, hour-by-hour demand, 
must be met with real-time generation, since an economically fea-
sible electricity reservoir does not yet exist. 
Electricity storage could revolutionize the energy market by 
allowing it to operate in a manner more analogous to the natural 
 
28. See STEVEN FERREY, 1 L. OF INDEP. POWER § 2:21 (2018). 
29. BAKKE, supra note 1, at 5. 
30. See Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 
42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, fn. 51 (2010).  
31. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 
521–22 (2d ed. 2006). 
32. Id. at 522. 
33. See e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. Electric System Operating Data 
– Status Map (Mar. 31, 2019), https://perma.cc/ED5J-HCVT. 
7
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gas industry. Not only would storage be beneficial in harnessing 
excess variable generation produced from sources like wind and 
solar, but it could also allow utilities to procure power produced at 
a period of low demand at a low rate, and reinject it back to the 
grid during periods of high demand and be paid the rate commen-
surate with peak demand.34 But, storing energy is not a new con-
cept. A few states have been experimenting in the area for several 
years, with California at the forefront.35 By encouraging state en-
ergy policies and federal support, it is possible to spur enough in-
vestment in storage resources to advance technology to the point 
of economic viability. 
A. California’s Energy Storage Systems Procurement 
Mandate 
The State of California is a pioneer of the clean energy move-
ment and a national leader alongside states like New York and 
Massachusetts in encouraging and developing state energy storage 
programs.36 California’s Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) has 
authority over all electric utilities, including locally owned electric 
corporations.37 With this authority, CPUC implements aggressive 
renewable energy programs such as a Renewable Portfolio Stand-
ard (“RPS”) and a state ESR procurement mandate.38 In 2017, Cal-
ifornia’s RPS resulted in the state’s Investor Owned Utilities39 
 
34. See FERREY, supra note 28. 
35. See e.g., New York State Energy Storage, N.Y.  STATE ENERGY & RESEARCH 
& DEV. AUTH., https://perma.cc/XH8F-GWP2 (New York state energy storage pro-
gram); Energy Storage Initiatives, MASS. DEPT. OF ENERGY & RESOURCES, 
https://perma.cc/XE32-ASUR (Massachusetts energy storage program). 
36. Krysti Shallenberger, Massachusetts Targets 200 MWh of Energy Storage 
by 2020, UTILITY DIVE (June 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/8LU9-87BN. 
37. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 2019); Assemb. 2514, 2009–10 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
38. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (West 2019); Assemb. 2514, 2009–10 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); California Renewables Portfolio Standard (“RPS”), CAL. 
PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, https://perma.cc/RH5R-WZNS [hereinafter CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
COMM’N]. 
39. Public utility companies are the primary providers of electricity in the 
United States—Investor Owned Utilities or “IOUs” are privately rather than pub-
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(“IOUs”) providing customers with a power mix composed of 36% 
renewable power.40 
By adding a new chapter to its Utilities Code, California tar-
geted energy storage technology and aimed to grow the usage of 
such technology within the state by implementing mandatory us-
age quotas.41 The new chapter focuses on Energy Storage Systems 
(“ESSs”)42 which the CPUC defines as “commercially available 
technology that is capable of absorbing energy, storing it for a pe-
riod of time, and thereafter dispatching the energy.”43 Through 
Public Utility Commission rulemaking, California’s mandate di-
rects the three IOUs in the state, Pacific Gas and Electric, South-
ern California Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric, to procure 
a combined 1,325 megawatts (“MWs”) of energy from ESSs by the 
year 2020.44 The guiding principles of the procurement policy—and 
thus targets of the law—focus on optimizing the electrical grid, in-
tegrating renewable energy, and reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions.45 
The CPUC code suggests that ESSs may have the characteris-
tics of being either centralized or distributed, or be owned by load 
serving entities (“LSEs”),46 local electric utilities, customers of 
 
40. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, supra note 38. 
41. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2836(a)(1) (West 2013) (“[T]he commission shall 
open a proceeding to determine appropriate targets . . . to procure viable and cost-
effective energy storage[.]”); Id. § 2837 (explaining that each renewable energy 
procurement plan “shall require the utility to procure new energy storage systems 
that are appropriate to allow the electrical corporation to comply with the [pro-
curement mandate.]”).  
42. Id § 2835(a)(1) (defining Energy Storage System as ESS, the term the 
California statute and public utility code use to reference ESRs, and the terms 
should be viewed as referring to the same variety of resources). 
43.  Id. 
44. Decision Adopting Energy Storage Procurement Framework and Design 
Program at 2, Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to Assembly Bill 2514 to 
Consider the Adoption of Procurement Targets for Viable and Cost-Effective En-
ergy Storage Systems, Decision 13-10-040, Oct. 17, 2013 (on file with Cal. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n.) (decision issued in rulemaking 10-12-007 filed Dec. 16, 2013) 
[hereinafter Procurement Targets Rulemaking]. 
45. Id. at app. A § 1.  
46. LSE, or “load serving entity, means an electrical corporation, electric ser-
vice provider, or community choice aggregator.” The public utility code excludes 
the following things from being defined as LSEs: local publicly owned electric util-
ities, the State Water Project, and eligible customer-side generation. CAL. PUB. 
UTIL. CODE § 380(k) (West 2019). 
9
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LSEs or utilities, “a third party, or [be] jointly owned by two or 
more” of the previously suggested owners.47 
An ESS in California must be cost-effective and must serve at 
least one of the following goals: reduce greenhouse gases, reduce 
peak electrical demand, substitute or defer for an investment in 
energy infrastructure, or improve grid reliability.48 Finally, ESSs 
must perform at least one of four listed functions by using mechan-
ical, chemical, or thermal processes to store energy produced at one 
time for later use. These functions include storing energy gener-
ated from renewable resources, storing energy that was generated 
by a mechanical process that would otherwise be wasted,49 or stor-
ing thermal energy for direct usage in heating and cooling, which 
would serve to offset the use of electricity at a later date.50 
California’s storage mandate will operate hand-in-hand with 
the RPS, which establishes targets for renewable energy sales in 
the state, and sets the goal of comprising 60% of all retail sales of 
electricity in the state to be from eligible renewable energy re-
sources by December 31, 2030.51 The aim of California’s RPS is 
conferring benefits on residents of the state such as  displacing fos-
sil fuel consumption, reducing air pollution, meeting climate 
change goals, promoting stable retail rates for electric service, di-
versifying the state’s energy generation portfolio, and contributing 
to the safe and reliable operation of the grid, amongst other bene-
fits.52 Additionally, the Public Utility Code insists that energy 
“generated by eligible renewable energy resources is necessary to 
improve California’s air quality and public heath, particularly in 
disadvantaged communities[.]”53 
 
47. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2835(a)(2)(A)–(B). 
48. Id. § 2835(a)(3). 
49. Id. §§ 2835(a)(4)(A)–(D). For example, perhaps a surge of wind-genera-
tion was produced during a lull in demand; if the surplus cannot be stored and is 
not required for immediate use, the energy generated by the windmill would go 
to waste.  
50. Id. (the later date, presumably being a period of high demand). 
51. Id. § 399.11(a). 
52. Id. § 399.11(b). 
53. Id. § 399.11(e)(1). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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B. Operation of California’s Electricity Market 
California operates a regulated retail electricity market using 
cost-of-service ratemaking,54 while the wholesale markets are 
FERC-controlled competitive-market systems overseen by the Cal-
ifornia Independent Systems Operator (“CAISO”).55 CAISO, like 
the other RTO/ISOs56 in their respective jurisdictions, is “respon-
sible for ensuring equitable and reliable access to the [] grid”, and 
ensuring “fair transmission pricing.”57 To better understand the 
relationship between the retail market and the RTOs, a basic un-
derstanding of the RTO system is helpful. 
1. Regional Transmission Organizations, Generally 
To prevent issues that may occur if the same entity owns all of 
the generation, transmission, and distribution assets in a particu-
lar area, utilities voluntarily form RTOs and place control of their 
transmission assets under the direct management of the independ-
ent, impartial entities.58 By vesting control of transmission assets 
in an impartial body, competition is preserved by avoiding any pos-
sible self-dealing or other abuses that could occur if utilities them-
selves were able to make decisions as to which generators are 
granted access to transmission lines.59 
Because generators of electricity have open access to transmis-
sion assets, they are assured a market to sell their products so long 
as they produce in a cost-effective manner.60 RTOs operate under 
 
54. See generally CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N., CONSUMER AND RETAIL CHOICE, 
THE ROLE OF THE UTILITY, AND AN EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2017), 
https://perma.cc/H2FD-C5AL [hereinafter EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK]. 
55. See Understanding the ISO, CALIFORNIA ISO, https://perma.cc/P2RZ-
2267. 
56. The labels RTO and ISO are largely synonymous and should be viewed 
as such for the purposes of this article.  See TOMAIN, supra note 13, at 406—07 
(explaining that an ISO is a not-for-profit RTO); see generally Order No. 841, su-
pra note 12, at 9,580 (using “RTO/ISO” throughout the rule to reference FERC-
controlled transmission organizations). 




60. Final Rulemaking, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Ac-
cess Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 
21,540 (1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. parts 35, 385) [hereinafter Order 888]. 
11
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the presumption that “competition, rather than regulation, pro-
vides the most effective means to improve service reliability and 
reduce the cost of electricity to consumers[;]”61 therefore, the RTO 
will only procure as much generation as is required by correspond-
ing demand. To keep prices down, they accept bids from generators 
offering the lowest price first, and gradually accept higher bids as 
demand increases, capping the procurement at the amount of 
power needed to satisfy the demand.62 The highest bid accepted, 
known as the “clearing price,” is the rate paid to all generators ac-
cepted into the market.63 Public utilities within the region served 
by the RTO can then procure their power from the RTO-run power 
auction, or enter into bilateral contracts with generators—those 
contracts being subject to FERC review to determine whether the 
contracts are unjust or unreasonable.64 
2. California Investor Owned Utilities’ Procurement of 
Power 
California IOUs procure the power they distribute to retail 
customers primarily in two ways; the first being through the 
CAISO wholesale market.65 Using this method, the IOU buys 
power sent to CAISO from generators who have cleared the market 
for the specified period of time.66 The IOU does not know exactly 
who produced the power or exactly what fuel was used to generate 
it—they only know that they are getting a unit of power composed 
of the specified fuel mix provided by CAISO. The second way an 
IOU procures power is via bilateral contracts with generators—
although this avoids the wholesale market, these transactions are 
still subject to a “just and reasonableness” review by FERC.67 Pro-
curing power in this manner allows an IOU to know exactly what 
 
61. YUFFEE ET AL., supra note 57, at § 89.01. 
62. See generally Learning Center, PJM, https://perma.cc/NUS5-GFSW. 
63. Id. 
64. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (explaining that whenever the Commission finds 
any rate or charge for a wholesale sale of generation or transmission to be unjust 
or unreasonable, the Commission can void the rate or charge and substitute it 
with their own price deemed to be just and reasonable); see also Learning Center, 
supra note 62. 
65. Market Processes and Products, CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR,  
https://perma.cc/E6US-JW5N.   
66. Id.  
67. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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type of fuel was used to produce the acquired electricity. In both 
scenarios, FERC has authority over the wholesale transaction, 
while the CPUC governs the subsequent retail sales.68 In fulfilling 
the California mandate to procure a particular amount of genera-
tion from ESSs, it is important that IOUs keep track of every kilo-
watt of ESS power procured and get corresponding documentation 
to prove compliance with the law.69 The cost burden for the ESS 
procurement program is distributed to California ratepayers based 
on the amount of power each utility procures;70 this cost-based re-
covery scheme is appropriate so long as the rates paid are propor-
tional to the realized benefits.71 
 
III. FEDERALISM AND PREEMPTION 
Order 841 was adopted to “remove barriers to the participation 
of electric storage resources in the . . . [RTO] and Independent Sys-
tem Operator [markets].”72 With Order 841, FERC mandated that 
RTOs provide unique market rules that “recogniz[e] the physical 
and operational characteristics of [ESRs and] facilitate their par-
ticipation in the [wholesale market].”73 But, while the Order looks 
promising for manufacturers and users of ESR technology, what 
does it mean for states like California? Under this new regime, is 
it possible for federal and state jurisdiction to get along? According 
to Mark Kalpin, a partner in the Washington D.C. office of Holland 
& Knight, LLP, “[t]here are a lot of seams that are going to have to 
be worked out and thought through.”74 
 
68. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a); 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). 
69. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE. §§ 2836, 2837. 
70. FERREY, supra note 28. 
71. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2838.3 (West 2017); see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE 
§ 451 (West 1977). 
72. Order No. 841, supra note 12, at 9,580. 
73. Id. at 9,582 (recall that under the FPA, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction 
over all transmission and wholesale sales of electric energy in interstate com-
merce). 
74. Keith Goldberg, FERC Energy Storage Rule Is a Grid Game-Changer, 
LAW360 (Feb. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/KVA6-FMRQ. 
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A. The Benefit of the Federal System 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes the 
laws of the United States “the supreme Law of the Land[.]”75 But, 
the United States operates on a system of dual sovereignty where 
state and federal authority run concurrently, giving the states 
great latitude to govern so long as they do not run afoul of the su-
premacy of the federal government.76 By declaring that all powers 
not specifically granted to the federal government be reserved to 
the states or citizens, the Constitution allows states far-reaching 
authority to pursue their own legislative priorities.77 
The creation of two governments, but one to rule them all, is 
premised on the idea of enhancing freedom—not condemning it to 
the purgatory of legislative gridlock.78 Giving concurrent powers to 
the state and federal governments “enhances freedom [] by protect-
ing the integrity of [those bodies] themselves, [] and by protecting 
the [citizens], from whom all governmental powers are derived.”79 
There are many benefits of this structure, but a notable few include 
the creation of a government which is “sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society[;]”80 allowing states to be labora-
tories of democracy by permitting governmental innovation and ex-
perimentation; and promoting the ideology of a capitalist society 
by forcing states to compete for citizenry which in turn affects con-
gressional influence.81 
B. The Preemptive Power of FERC 
Although states exercise great authority in structuring their 
governments and pursuing their own objectives, they must yield to 
federal law when a preemptive situation arises.82 This yield to fed-
eral supremacy applies equally to federal statutes and regula-
tions.83 Federal regulations are promulgated by executive branch 
 
75. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
76. Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19 (2013). 
77. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013). 
78. See Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999). 
79. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011). 
80. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
81. Id. 
82. Shelby Cty., 570 U.S. at 542–43.  
83. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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agencies which “are subject to multiple sources of law, including 
constitutional provisions . . ., the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), ‘organic statutes’” and judge-made law.84 Many regula-
tory and benefit programs are so large and complex that Congress 
is not well suited to craft the intricate rules required to govern such 
programs, thus they pass organic statues which grant authority to 
administrative agencies to craft rules carrying the force of federal 
law.85 Where an agency administrator (or a Commission) promul-
gates regulations intended to preempt state law, the court can 
make only limited inquiry.86 If the regulation is a “reasonable ac-
commodation” of policy committed to the agency’s discretion by its 
organic statute, the court will not overturn it unless the statute or 
legislative history shows the policy runs counter to the intentions 
of Congress.87 Additionally, a reviewing court can assess the regu-
lation for procedural deficiencies and reject regulations pursuant 
to the APA.88 Therefore, FERC, as an executive branch agency, has 
the authority to promulgate rules, which could have preemptive 
effect on state law. 
FERC’s relevant source of authority comes from Part II of the 
FPA, which was passed in 1935 and stands largely intact today.89 
The division of power between state and federal authority is bro-
ken up by section 201 of the FPA which states “the business of 
transmitting and selling electric energy . . . to the public is affected 
with [the] public interest, and that Federal regulation . . . [over] 
the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the 
sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce is neces-
sary in the public interest[.]”90 Such federal regulation extends 
only to matters not regulated by the states, and does not extend “to 
 
84. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AGENCY 
ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 1 (2d ed. 2018). 
85. Id. at 6–7. 
86. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 458 U.S. at 154 (citing United States v. Shimer, 
367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)). 
87. Id.  
88. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59, 701–03 (2018). 
89. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a–824w (2018); see also Lawrence R. Greenfield, An 
Overview of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Federal Regulation 
of Public Utilities, FERC (2017), https://perma.cc/B2NH-WAMT. 
90. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
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any other sale of electric energy[,]” and does not give FERC author-
ity over “facilities used for the generation of electric energy[.]”91 A 
1995 FERC holding sheds some light on the authority left to the 
states under the FPA.92 In this case, the Commission stated, “[a]s 
a general matter, states have broad powers under state law to di-
rect the planning and resource decisions of utilities under their ju-
risdiction.”93 Comparing this holding to recent holdings from the 
federal courts is further demonstrative.94 Three decisions, in par-
ticular, address the dynamic between state and federal authority 
in the energy market, and provide a framework for assessing mod-
ern state and federal energy initiatives. 
 
IV. FEDERALISM IN THE ENERGY ECONOMY 
The following three cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
highlight the unique inquiries to be made when evaluating 
preemption issues in the energy economy. 
A. Oneok, Inc., v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015) 
Oneok v. Learjet made its way to the Supreme Court on appeal 
from the Ninth Circuit, where the Court affirmed the Court of Ap-
peals and held that a state law antitrust claim did not fall within 
a field preempted by the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”).95 Although 
dealing with the NGA and not the FPA, Oneok is relevant to an 
inquiry into electricity because the Court’s analysis grapples with 
FERC’s authority to determine whether any “rate, charge, or clas-
sification . . . or any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting 
such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly 
discriminatory, or preferential[.]”96 This is the same duty charged 
 
91. Id. § 824(b)(1). 
92. See generally S. Cal. Edison Co. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 71 FERC ¶ 
61,269 (June 2, 1995). 
93. Id. at 62,080. 
94. See infra, Part IV. 
95. Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1602–03; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2018). 
96. 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a); Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1596. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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to FERC regarding review of electrical rates and charges under the 
FPA.97 
In Oneok, a group of natural gas pipeline operators backed by 
the United States98 sought certiorari to resolve the issue of 
“whether the Natural Gas Act pre-empts retail customers’ state 
antitrust law challenges to practices that also affect wholesale 
rates.”99 The preemption analysis focused solely on field preemp-
tion, which occurs when Congress forbids states from taking action 
in a particular field by wholly occupying that field with federal 
law.100 Compare field preemption with conflict preemption, which 
occurs when a federal law cannot operate correctly due to an exist-
ing state law or compliance with both the relevant state and fed-
eral law would be impossible.101 
Petitioners in Oneok asserted that respondents’ claims under 
state antitrust law were field preempted because the NGA wholly 
occupies the field of wholesale rate regulation and the state law 
antitrust claims challenged practices affecting wholesale rates.102 
The NGA confers explicit authority to FERC to ensure wholesale 
rates are reasonable and, with this authority, FERC prohibits an-
ticompetitive activity that would provide for unjust or unreasona-
ble rates.103 Addressing this issue with delicate regard for state 
freedom, Justice Breyer quoted Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 
v. Public Service Commission of Indiana stating “the Natural Gas 
Act ‘was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise 
of state power, not to handicap or dilute it in any way.’”104 Compare 
this statement with language in the FPA stating that regulation of 
transmitting and selling electric energy is affected with the public 
interest and thus requires federal regulation, but such regulation 
can “extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation 
 
97. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); see also Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. 
Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 506 (1989) (“The natural gas industry is subject to inter-
locking regulation both by federal and state authorities.”). 
98. Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 1595. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. at 1598. 
103. Id. at 1599. 
104. Id. (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 
332 U.S. 507, 517–18 (1947)).  
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by the States.”105 It would appear that the FPA was written with 
the same meticulous regard for continuing exercise of state power 
that was employed when drafting the NGA. 
Addressing field preemption in the context of natural gas, Jus-
tice Breyer drew upon precedents that considered the target of the 
state law in question—the target being the dispositive factor in the 
preemption analysis.106 With this analysis, Justice Breyer empha-
sized a “dividing line” between state and federal authority107 using 
two Supreme Court holdings, both arising out of Kansas and au-
thored by Justice Brennan: Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Cor-
poration Commission of Kansas108 and Northwest Central Pipeline 
Corp. v. State Corporation Commission of Kansas.109 
1. Northern Natural, Northwest Central, and Aiming at 
the NGA 
In Northern Natural, the Court held that a Kansas program 
requiring an interstate pipeline company to “purchase gas ratably 
from all wells connecting with its pipeline system in each gas field 
within the State”110 was an invalid invasion of Federal Power Com-
mission’s (the Federal Power Commission is now called FERC) ex-
clusive jurisdiction because the federal regulatory scheme left “no 
room either for direct state regulation of the prices of interstate 
wholesales of natural gas, or for state regulations which would in-
directly achieve the same result.”111 The target of this law was the 
manner in which gas was to be purchased, which had an effect on 
FERC’s wholesale market.112 The aim of the law totally missed the 
state carve-out for “production and gathering,” which would have 
 
105. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (emphasis added). 
106. Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1599–1600. 
107. Id. at 1600. 
108. See generally N. Nat. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n. of Kan., 372 U.S. 
84 (1963). 
109. See generally Nw. Cent., 489 U.S. at 493. 
110. N. Nat. Gas Co., 372 U.S. at 86. 
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allowed the law to stand as a valid exercise of state power author-
ized by the federal law.113 Contrast this result with Northwest Cen-
tral, where the issue was a Kansas regulation “providing for the 
permanent cancellation of producers’ entitlements to quantities 
of . . . gas.”114 
In Northwest Central, the pipeline companies argued that a 
regulation was preempted because it caused pipelines to increase 
the amount of gas purchased from a particular gas field, affecting 
the companies’ purchase mixes and cost structures, and also that 
it infringed on FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction “over the abandon-
ment of gas reserves dedicated to interstate commerce.”115 The 
Kansas Commission aimed to regulate the Hugoton gas field to 
protect the property rights of stakeholders sharing in a common 
pool of gas and to prevent the waste of the gas in the field116 using 
the “production and gathering” exemption from federal regulation 
under the NGA.117 
After much movement through the courts, including two trips 
to both the Kansas Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, 
Justice Brennan ultimately held that, because the aim of the Kan-
sas regulation was the production of gas and not its marketing, it 
was not preempted under the NGA.118 Because the NGA articu-
lates a division of state and federal power over the natural gas in-
dustry and identifies areas into which federal authority cannot ex-
tend, a state regulation aimed at the very area of the law carved 




113. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (the “production and gathering” exemption from fed-
eral regulation).  
114. Nw. Cent., 489 U.S. at 496–97 (this was said to have had the effect of 
the Kansas commission dictating the timing of production of gas from a particular 
oil field).  
115. Id. at 497. 
116. Id. 
117. 15 U.S.C. § 717(b); see Nw. Cent., 489 U.S. at 508 (district court holding 
that the Kansas regulation fell within the exemption). 
118. Nw. Cent., 489 U.S. at 509. 
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (providing an exemption from federal regulation 
to matters pertaining to the production or gathering of natural gas); Nw. Cent., 
489 U.S. at 510 (discussing the NGA and the jurisdictional divide). 
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248 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 36 
2. Application of Northern Natural and Northwest 
Central to Oneok 
Going back to Oneok and Justice Breyer’s “dividing line” be-
tween state and federal authority, “the importance of considering 
the target at which the state law aims in determining whether that 
law is pre-empted” is of crucial significance.120 Illustrating this 
point is a hypothetical given by the Court. “Suppose FERC . . . had 
denied cost recovery for pipelines’ failure to recycle. Would that fact 
deny States the power to enact and apply recycling laws? These 
state laws might well raise pipelines’ operating costs, and thus the 
costs of wholesale natural gas transportation.”121 The hypothetical 
illustrates that finding field preemption merely because costs and 
rates122 might be affected by a state law aimed at an issue irrele-
vant to the federal law at issue would nullify the express carve-out 
for state power under the federal statute.123 The analysis led the 
Court to affirm the Court of Appeals and find that the state law 
antitrust claims were not preempted by the NGA.124 With this con-
cept in mind, consider the following cases decided by the Supreme 
Court in 2016. 
B. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 
(2016) 
In FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n (“EPSA”), Justice Ka-
gan explained that the FPA grants FERC authority over “‘the sale 
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,’ including 
both wholesale electricity rates and any rule or practice ‘affecting’ 
such rates[, b]ut the law places beyond FERC’s power, and leaves 
to the States alone, the regulation of ‘any other sale’––most nota-
bly, any retail sale––of electricity.”125 The issue in the case per-
 
120. Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
121. Id. at 1601 (emphasis added). 
122. Costs and rates are included in FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 717. 
123. Oneok, 135 S. Ct. at 1601. 
124. Id. at 1602–03. 
125. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 766 (citations omitted). A wholesale sale is any sale 
for resale, while a retail sale is any sale to an end-user.16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (provid-
ing the definition of “wholesale;” the definition of “retail” is inferred by the defini-
tion of “wholesale” and its dictionary definition).  
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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tained to FERC Order 745, where FERC directed the regional au-
thorities to pay providers of “demand response” (“DR”)126 the “lo-
cational marginal price” (“LMP”),127 which is the price the regional 
authorities paid to power generators.128 The D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals held Order 745 invalid because it lured retail customers 
into the wholesale market by regulating retail consumers’ con-
sumption of power via demand response rates.129 Because a federal 
actor has no authority over retail markets or customers, the D.C. 
Circuit invalidated Order 745.130 
Recognizing that FERC’s action in this case had mere indirect 
effect on the retail market and a direct effect on the wholesale mar-
ket, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and held that 
FERC had the authority to regulate the rate paid to demand re-
sponders because such a regulation “govern[ed] a practice directly 
affecting [a] wholesale [] rate[].”131 Regarding FERC’s regulation of 
DR and the indirect effect it would have on retail markets, the 
court noted, “although (inevitably) influencing the retail market 
too, the [Order] does not intrude on the States’ power to regulate 
retail sales.”132 Because the Order governed a practice directly af-
fecting wholesale electricity rates, FERC’s statutory authority val-




126. Demand response is the idea of selling a commitment to curtail energy 
use. Rather than the RTO procuring an additional increment of generation from 
the market, it will accept bids to curtail an equivalent increment of load. This 
allows the wholesale market to balance supply and demand while lessening over-
all stain on the grid. See BOSSELMAN, ET AL., supra note 31, at 901; see also EPSA, 
136 S. Ct. at 770. 
127. Locational marginal price, or LMP, is explained as “a way for wholesale 
electric energy prices to reflect the value of electric energy at different locations, 
accounting for the patterns of load, generation, and the physical limits of the 
transmission system.” See FAQs: Locational Marginal Pricing, ISO-NEW 
ENGLAND, https://perma.cc/D5K5-PPEG. 
128. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 771; see Order No. 745, Demand Response Compe-
tition in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,666–69 
(Mar. 24, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(v)) [hereinafter Order No. 745]. 
129. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 772.  
130. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a)–(d); EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 772. 
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C. Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 
1288 (2016) 
Hughes v. Talen Energy explores the federalism dynamic fur-
ther and introduces the “tethered” rule.134 In Talen Energy, the 
State of Maryland took action providing a generating plant a guar-
anteed rate to sell its capacity in the wholesale auction adminis-
tered by the FERC—run regional authority, PJM Interconnection 
(“PJM”).135 The Maryland program created a “contract for differ-
ences” with a gas-fired generator run by a company called CPV.136 
The contract for differences had the effect of providing CPV a guar-
anteed rate for its capacity, so long as its bid was accepted into the 
FERC-run capacity auction.137 If CPV’s bid cleared the market and 
the ultimate clearing price was lower than the contract price Mar-
yland and CPV contracted for, Maryland “load serving entities” 
(“LSEs”)138 would pay CPV the difference.139 Conversely, if the 
clearing price was higher than the contract price, CPV would re-
fund the LSEs for the difference.140 Failure to clear the market re-
sulted in no payment from LSEs or PJM, thus CPV had a strong 
incentive to bid into the market at or around $0,141 and could count 
on cost recovery from the Maryland state government.142 
Because this state-sponsored initiative tethered the partici-
pating generator to the FERC market and allowed it to disregard 
the rate set by the federal authority, the Court ruled that Mary-
land’s action was an impermissible encroachment on FERC’s terri-
tory.143 Narrowly construing the holding, Justice Ginsburg ex-
plained, “[n]othing in [the] opinion should be read to foreclose 
Maryland and other States from encouraging production of new or 
 
134. Talen Energy, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
135. Id. at 1294–95. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1295. 
138. A load serving entity is an organization that delivers electricity to retail 
customers. Id. at 1292. 
139. Id. at 1295. 
140. Id. 
141. Once a generator has satisfied the “Minimum Offer Price Rule 
(“MOPR”),” it is common practice for the generator to bid into to the market at $0 
ensuring some payment so long as another generator bids up the clearing price. 
Id. at 1294–95. 
142. See id. at 1298–99. 
143. Id. at 1299. 
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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clean generation through measures ‘untethered to a generator’s 
wholesale market participation.’”144 As these cases have illus-
trated, the bright jurisdictional lines the 74th Congress thought 
they provided in the FPA are not so bright at all, and a continu-
ously developing energy economy only further strains the 83-year-
old statute. 
 
V. ASSESSING THE CALIFORNIA STORAGE 
PROGRAM 
 The cases discussed above provide a legal framework for as-
sessing state and federal energy initiatives. Because of constant 
jurisdictional tensions, any federal program must not run afoul of 
the express carve-out for state authority in the FPA, and any state 
program must be assessed for federal preemption. 
A. The Problem in California 
California’s trailblazing procurement program intends to 
bring 1,325 MWs of stored energy to California’s power mix by 
2020145 and facilitate the goal of achieving 60% renewable energy 
in the state by 2030.146 Aiming to reduce greenhouse gases, reduce 
peak electrical demand, defer or substitute investment in tradi-
tional energy infrastructure, and improve overall grid reliability, 
California’s procurement mandate targets broad public policy 
goals and benefits to residents of the state.147 Furthermore, be-
cause ESSs augment efficiency of renewable sources of energy, it 
can be implied that ESSs’ serve the goals of the RPS as well.148 By 
coupling the goals of the ESS mandate with the goals of the RPS, 
the target of the procurement mandate expands to things like dis-
placing fossil fuel consumption, reducing air pollution, meeting 
state climate change goals, and improving the quality of life for 
California’s most disadvantaged communities by improving air 
quality. 
 
144. Id. (emphasis added). 
145. Procurement Targets Rulemaking, supra note 44, at 2; Shallenberger, 
supra note 36. 
146. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11(a). 
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FERC Order 841 comes into play when considering the dy-
namic between retail and wholesale sales in California. Order 841 
mandates that any RTO (CAISO being one of them) open their 
market to ESRs in a non-discriminatory and accommodating fash-
ion.149 But California beat FERC to the punch by having a regime 
in place which incorporates storage resources into state public pol-
icy.150 California law refers to storage technology as ESSs, defining 
an ESS as “commercially available technology that is capable of 
absorbing energy, storing it for a period of time, and thereafter dis-
patching the energy.”151 California’s mandate to procure 1,325 MW 
of ESS power raises an interesting question now that FERC Order 
841 is the federal law; whether or not the state law is preempted. 
1. A Hypothetical to Illustrate 
Consider the following hypothetical.152 Storage Co., a provider 
of ESS in California, wants to take advantage of the new FERC 
Order mandating CAISO not only be completely non-discrimina-
tory in allowing ESSs into the wholesale markets, but also must be 
accommodating to the unique physical and operational character-
istics of these resources as well. Storage Co. no longer needs to hag-
gle with the IOUs and bargain for certain treatment—they can go 
straight to CAISO for a ready market required by federal law to 
recognize the unique quirks of operating a storage resource. 
For example, Storage Co. operates a lithium ion battery facil-
ity. Battery life is measured in cycles, where one cycle is a charge 
to full capacity, then a total discharge of that capacity.153 In order 
to maximize the life of a battery, cycling must be limited, and the 
battery should continuously maintain a charge of about 50-60 per-
cent to the maximum extent possible.154 If the battery is dis-
charged in a manner consistent with Storage Co.’s instructions, the 
useful life of the battery could be extended from about three years, 
 
149. Order No. 841, 83 Fed. Reg. at 9,582. 
150. See Procurement Targets Rulemaking, supra note 44. 
151. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2835(a)(1). 
152. The fact pattern used for this hypothetical was drawn from Indianapo-
lis Power & Light Co. v. Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc. See generally 
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 158 FERC ¶ 61,107. 
153. Id. at 21. 
154. Id. at 22. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss2/2
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up to about ten years.155 If Storage Co. needs to negotiate with 
Southern California Edison (“SCE”) for discharge procedure rights, 
a discharge procedure that allows SCE to pull energy at a rate that 
maximizes cycles will reduce the life of the battery, and the cost of 
more frequent battery replacement, and disposal will be rolled into 
the rate bargained for, most likely driving up costs. By opting in-
stead to bid its power into CAISO, which is now required to adhere 
to the discharge method prescribed by Storage Co., there is no 
longer a need to bargain for treatment or power purchases with the 
IOUs. 
2. The Problem Highlighted by the Hypothetical 
The IOUs like SCE will now have a more difficult time bar-
gaining for generation produced by ESS providers because, as a 
result of Order 841, CAISO has become a much more attractive 
place to do business. If IOUs are to fulfill their ESS procurement 
mandate required by California law, they must now offer more at-
tractive rates and accommodating treatment to ESS providers, so 
that those providers, which have limited amounts of generation to 
sell, will sell that generation to the IOUs. However, by offering at-
tractive contract terms to soak up as much ESS generation as pos-
sible to fulfill the state law mandate, wholesale rates are affected. 
If an ESS that could contribute to the wholesale auction is now 
sucked out of that auction by more attractive terms driven by a 
state law, the state law needs to be evaluated to ensure that its 
effect on the wholesale market does not run afoul of the FPA or 
existing precedent. 
B. Does FERC Order 841 Stay Within Statutory 
Authority? 
The legal frameworks from Oneok v. Learjet, FERC v. Electric 
Power Supply Ass’n., and Hughes v. Talen Energy supply an appro-
priate method to evaluate this issue. FERC has overseen CAISO 
since its inception, so federal governance here is not new.156 What 
is new is FERC’s take on ESRs, or as California calls them, 
 
155. Id. 
156. See 16 U.S.C. 824a; see also Final Rulemaking, Regional Transmission 
Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (Jan. 6, 2000) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) 
[hereinafter Order 2000] (creating RTOs).  
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ESSs.157 Prior to Order 841, FERC had been silent on the idea of 
stored energy in the wholesale markets. Order 841’s direction 
could represent a federal power-grab over a class of resources 
which receives widely different treatment among the states. But, 
FERC’s order does not direct RTO/ISOs to actually procure a single 
kilowatt of ESR power—it simply says that if a provider of energy 
storage is technically capable of providing a service and can offer 
that service at a completive rate, the RTO/ISO must allow that ser-
vice into whichever wholesale market it is capable of preforming 
in.158 
Compare this to Order 745 highlighted in EPSA.159 In that 
case, Order 745 required that the RTOs pay a certain rate to par-
ticipants in the demand response program.160 These participants 
were essentially retail customers curtailing retail consumption at 
the incentive of FERC, and being paid directly by the FERC whole-
sale market operators for the commitment to curtail usage.161 In 
EPSA, the Order’s direct effect was on the wholesale rate, as the 
source of the payment came from the wholesale operator and was 
statutorily prescribed to be the Locational Marginal Price.162 Re-
tail rates suffered mere indirect effect, as the Order did not regu-
late the price which retail customers paid, nor did it dictate any 
behavior in that market space.163 There was an indirect effect on 
retail rates because retail customers were curtailing usage, but as 
the Court noted, FERC’s statutory authority extends to practices 
(like the one at hand) which directly affect wholesale rates, thus, 
Order 745 withstood scrutiny as a practice directly affecting a 
wholesale rate.164 
Going back to the instant case, it can be determined that Order 
841’s effect is a practice directly affecting wholesale rates, and at 
best has an indirect effect on retail rates. Like in EPSA, there will 
be some amount of poaching customers from one market to the 
other, but those market effects are indirect. A direct effect on the 
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158. Order No. 841, supra note 12, at 9,582. 
159. See EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 771, 781–82. 
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California retail space would be something like a FERC direction 
to CAISO to sell ESS energy to end users at prescribed rates. Here, 
the situation does not come close to the standard needed to show a 
direct effect. Order 841 is a mandate to open markets and provide 
fair treatment, but it does not direct RTOs to procure any power, 
nor does it mention a rate to pay ESR providers that are accepted 
into the market.165 This is clearly a rule directly affecting the 
wholesale market’s rate, with indirect effects being felt in the retail 
space. For these reasons, Order 841 is within FERC’s statutory au-
thority. 
C. Is California’s State ESS Procurement Mandate a 
Lawful Exercise of State Power? 
Next, California’s procurement mandate is examined to deter-
mine if it runs afoul of the Supremacy Clause of the federal gov-
ernment. FERC’s issuance of Order 841 is a regulation of the 
wholesale power markets—an area of law already reserved to 
FERC. The underlying policy of Order 841 is not to preclude states 
from encouraging energy storage, but to make the wholesale mar-
ket more inclusive. This goal encourages the use of ESR resources, 
thus causing ESR capabilities to increase while the costs associ-
ated with them decrease through technological advances.166 Cali-
fornia’s procurement mandate serves the goal of Order 841 by en-
couraging ESS providers to operate in the state of California, 
which facilitates development and cost effectiveness of such re-
sources.167 
The target of California’s law is not the FERC wholesale mar-
ket; it is aimed squarely at policy reserved to the state by an ex-
press carve-out for state authority in the FPA.168 By directing 
IOUs within the state to procure energy from ESSs, the CPUC 
aims at things like reducing greenhouse gases, reducing peak elec-
trical demand, deferring or substituting investment in energy in-
frastructure, and improving grid reliability.169 This aim comingles 
with the state RPS which targets the goal of acquiring 60% of the 
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energy used in the state from renewable sources by 2030.170 These 
aims are nowhere near the FERC wholesale markets, and certainly 
not close to “transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce 
and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate com-
merce[.]”171 
Compare the California program to the Kansas programs 
highlighted by the Oneok Court. In Northern Natural, a Kansas 
law that aimed directly at an area of law governed by FERC was 
held invalid.172 In that case, the state law had an impermissible 
effect on the wholesale market for natural gas because the aim of 
the law was not protected by any form of jurisdictional carve-out 
in the NGA.173 Contrast that result with the holding in Northwest 
Central, where a Kansas law affecting natural gas purchase mixes 
and cost structures was upheld because the target of the law was 
an express carve-out for state authority in the NGA.174 In Oneok, 
the Court noted that the NGA “was drawn with meticulous regard 
for the continued exercise of state power,” and was not intended “to 
handicap or dilute it in any way.”175 Looking at the FPA’s carve 
out for state power in section 201, it appears that the statute was 
drawn with the same meticulous regard for state power.176 Califor-
nia’s target is most certainly a matter subject to regulation by the 
states because it is not business consisting of transmission of elec-
tricity in interstate commerce or the sale of electricity at wholesale 
in interstate commerce—it targets broad public policy goals that 
benefit the state’s residents.177 California’s law thus survives a 
field preemption analysis. 
Next, a look into the effect of California’s law on the wholesale 
market is required. By requiring state IOUs to procure a certain 
amount of ESS generated electricity, an effect is felt on the CAISO 
market. Since procuring energy from the CAISO market does not 
allow IOUs to verify the fuel source of the purchased electricity, 
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IOUs must procure the mandatory ESS generated power using bi-
lateral contracts. Because the state law mandates the IOUs to pro-
cure a specified amount of stored energy and there is not an abun-
dance of this type of resource, IOUs will probably offer very 
attractive rates and terms to the ESS generators, thus diverting 
them from the wholesale market. But there is a big difference be-
tween affecting a rate and poaching a customer, as shown in 
EPSA.178 
In the EPSA case, the Court grappled with the issue of retail 
customers being lured into the wholesale market, and at the same 
time, curtailing their retail consumption, all because of a federal 
program.179 In the instant case, a state law could presumably lure 
generators who would be selling energy to the FERC market to in-
stead sell that power to IOUs directly. By taking supply from the 
FERC market, there is less power available to meet demand, and 
the market could be forced to accept a higher clearing price. Be-
cause the clearing price is the wholesale rate paid to generators 
selling electric energy in interstate commerce, a state law having 
a direct effect on said rate would be invalidated by the FPA.180 
While this idea could raise an eyebrow, it should be disre-
garded. The EPSA Court found a direct effect on the wholesale rate 
when providers of demand response were provided with a statuto-
rily prescribed rate, the LMP.181 The fact that retail customers left 
the retail market and sold their curtailment to the wholesale mar-
ket was considered to be an indirect effect on the retail market.182 
Using Oneok further focuses the idea. 
The Oneok rule requires an examination into the aim of the 
state law in question, as the target of such aim feels the direct ef-
fect.183 Looking at the California storage law, the aim is to increase 
in-state ESS usage by targeting IOUs serving California’s retail 
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customers.184 The direct effect of this aim is a change in retail rate 
paid by Californians, because as a state using cost-of-service rate-
making,185 the IOUs will recover the cost of procuring the state 
mandated resources through retail rates approved by CPUC.186 
The effect on retail rates is not only direct, but it is certain. Because 
California state law mandates the procurement of ESSs, the IOUs 
are procuring them,187 and they are rolling the cost into their retail 
rates—this is a perfect example of a state program landing 
squarely within an express carve-out for state power in a federal 
statute.188 As the Oneok Court explained, just because federal costs 
and rates may be affected by a state law, that does not mean that 
a finding of preemption is appropriate.189 When a state law aims 
squarely at a carve-out for state power in a federal statute, finding 
preemption would effectively nullify that portion of the statute and 
could not be what Congress intended when drafting the law.190 In 
the electricity market, a state law directly affecting retail rates 
squarely hits the carve-out in the FPA and thus cannot be conflict 
preempted. 
Finally, the California law must be evaluated using Talen En-
ergy to ensure that it is not inappropriately tethered to the whole-
sale market. In Talen Energy, the state of Maryland undertook a 
project to increase intrastate electrical generation by entering into 
a “contract for differences” with a generator called CPV.191 The in-
appropriate tether was the condition that CPV clear the PJM192 
capacity market in order to receive payment from either PJM or 
the Maryland LSEs, whichever was the higher of the two.193 If 
PJM’s market-based rate provided a higher price for CPV’s capac-
ity than the contract with Maryland, CPV would pay the LSEs the 
difference between the payment from PJM and the contract 
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price.194 If the PJM rate was below the contract price, the LSEs 
were obligated to pay CPV the difference.195 The tether is not hard 
to see. In the Court’s conclusion, Justice Ginsburg explained 
“[n]othing in [the] opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland 
and other States from encouraging production of new or clean gen-
eration through measures ‘untethered to a generator’s wholesale 
market participation.’”196 
The California ESS procurement mandate is an encourage-
ment of which Justice Ginsburg had in mind.197 By directing the 
state IOUs to procure a set amount of ESS generation and allowing 
the IOUs to recover the cost through retail rates, the wholesale 
market is completely avoided. Things cannot be tethered if they 
are not dependent on one another, and the California ESS procure-
ment mandate only depends on the IOUs being able to recover 
costs from retail customers.198 Because of the retail-based cost-re-
covery scheme used by California, the state program is not teth-




California’s Energy Storage Systems procurement mandate is 
a groundbreaking measure designed to supply more clean and re-
liable energy to the state by allowing the capture of power pro-
duced now, to be used later. While this technology is still develop-
ing, a ready market for such resources will help to advance its 
capabilities and bring down its cost. FERC Order 841 will spring-
board storage technology in regions covered by RTOs by allowing 
storage providers non-discriminatory and accommodating access 
to the FERC wholesale markets. Although Order 841 speaks di-
rectly to the issue of storage technology, it should not be seen as an 
effort to usurp or preempt state authority to encourage the use of 
storage technology for electricity generation in the states. By fo-
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cusing on the targets of state storage laws and honoring the au-
thority given to states in the FPA, a system of concurrent federal-
ism will allow state and federal law to operate hand-in-hand to pro-
mote the advancement of storage technology, thereby facilitating 
an era of clean, reliable power to fuel our nation’s future. 
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